






ABSTRACT: The evaluation of trust in economic decision making
remains on the periphery of mainstream economic analysis and teach-
ing. Yet business managers use trustworthiness in daily exchanges to
create competitive advantages for their ﬁrms. An exploratory empirical
test of Barney and Hansen’s three levels of trust (weak, semistrong, and
strong) and Lewicki and Bunker’s portfolio of governance mechanisms
revealed that strong-form trust exists in day-to-day business relation-
ships along with other governance mechanisms. Identity-based trans-
actions were more prevalent than were weak trust market exchanges in
important economic transactions.
Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efﬁcient; it saves a
lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word (Arrow, 1974, p. 23).
Trust is at the root of any economic system based on mutually beneﬁcial exchange.
If a signiﬁcant number of businesspeople violated the trust upon which our interactions
are based, our court system and our economy would be swamped into immobility
(Greenspan, 1999).
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, after nearly 30 years of neglect, there has been renewed interest
in trust as an important economic determinant of business success (Macaulay,
1963). A trustworthy identity, it is argued, is not only valuable information in an
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value for the ﬁrm. The business’ reputation may be more important for sustained
proﬁtability than the ﬁrm’s production technology (Sen, 1993). Yet skeptics in the
academic and business communities have questioned the empirical validity of
trust or social capital as useful decision variables or management concepts
(Williamson, 1993; Gardner, 1995). Our analytical models of transactions
between nameless people and ﬁrms have served economists well, according to
these critics. Trust only has a peripheral and minor role to play in an economy
characterized by self-interested calculativeness.
Recent business management literature has taken exception to identity-less
exchanges. Michalos (1990) argued that trust is an attitude that allows decision
makers to be vulnerable to harm in the interest of a perceived beneﬁt. This
risk-taking lubricant sustains the workings of a market economy. In the world of
work, managers depend on trust continuously in their day-to-day decision making,
according to Shapiro et al. (1992) where trust-based decisions are the rule rather
than the exception; a “treachery can pay” attitude exists in business but is not
dominant. Fukuyama (1995) claimed that countries with higher levels of trust are
more competitive in the global economy characterized by uncertainty. Trust is a
risk management tool, reducing the interaction costs of doing business and
creating a strategic advantage for ﬁrms within a country. The general business
sector has discovered that trusting employees (Handy, 1995), suppliers/buyers
(Kumar, 1996), and alliance partners (Nooteboom et al., 1997) leads to compet-
itive advantages that outweigh potential risks associated with opportunism
(Williamson, 1985).
A more volatile competitive environment for agribusiness has created renewed
interest in ﬁrm-level risk management (Boehlje and Lins, 1998). When sources of
risk are analyzed and management responses proposed, the prevalence of
relationship-centered challenges and opportunities is striking. In Boehlje and
Lin’s (1998) taxonomy of risks facing agribusiness ﬁrms, one half of the risk
sources contained identity-based relationships where trust could serve as a
governance or management tool to reduce the risk associated with that relation-
ship.
We argue in this article that trust is a productive, economic asset for the
business ﬁrm, not unlike information and knowledge, which appreciates in value
through use. Using an exploratory, multiple-case study research design, we
discover that selected agribusiness managers use a portfolio of governance
mechanisms, including strong-form trust. A well-managed portfolio reduces
transaction costs and creates competitive advantages for these ﬁrms. These
preliminary results also support greater use of game theory, contract design,
hierarchy analysis, and social capital in our agribusiness classrooms and research
programs.
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Sabel’s (1993) notion of trust centers on the mutual conﬁdence that parties to an
economic transaction will not exploit one another when one or both of the parties
are vulnerable to opportunism. This mutual assurance directed towards economic
behavior develops over time through daily observations. A shared understanding
develops to the point that short-term economic interests lose their absolute
motivational authority in decision making. A sense of duty and mutual depen-
dence grows stronger, thereby promoting a business environment of risk taking
and entrepreneurship under uncertainty.
Kreps (1990) extends this notion of trust as a tool for managing the unforeseen
to a theory of the business ﬁrm centering on reputation as the deﬁning
characteristic of the organization. Emerging from noncooperative game theory,
this theory of reputation relies on the empirical reality of contingencies in daily
business life. Successful ﬁrms adapt to unforeseen events efﬁciently and compet-
itively. Often decisions made under uncertainty and time constraints rely on a
principle or focal point to guide the choice. Trustworthiness can serve the role of
a guiding decision principle. So a corporate culture develops around a trust-based
focal point; it is observable by others, and a reputation develops. In Kreps’ (1990)
design, the business ﬁrm is not a production function nor a governance structure,
but rather an intangible object bearing a trustworthy reputation.
Trustworthy behavior is observable in economic transactions: repeated trans-
actions reveal the ﬁrm’s focal point, and a reputation is formed. Burchell and
Wilkinson, 1997) noted that ﬁrms with a reputation that they “do what they say
they will do” reduce transaction and monitoring costs for their trading partners.
These lower costs are not inconsequential, as revealed in the willingness of these
trading partners to pay slight price premiums and work out disagreements on a
mutually satisfactory basis to maintain the beneﬁcial relationship.
Incomplete contracts predominate in business. A mutual understanding of a
trustworthy reputation creates a trading environment that handles ex post facto
contingencies efﬁciently and effectively. Contracting parties place value on the
knowledge that ex post facto negotiations will be handled fairly, quickly, and
without the threat of holdup.
The presence of trust creates value for the ﬁrm because the ﬁrm, with a high
level of assurance, can make decisions today that will not be transacted until a
later time (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Increased ﬂexibility in volatile market
conditions increases the competitiveness of the business in economic upturns and
downturns. First-mover business commitments and ﬁnancial investments can be
made in search of economic rents with a high level of assurance that future
commitments will be honored.
But is trustworthiness an economic asset? Generally we refer to assets as
resources that create beneﬁts for the ﬁrm. Asset value is measurable, in most
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complement or substitute for one another. Even unidentiﬁable intangible assets,
such as goodwill, can be purchased, amortized, and sold (Welsch et al., 1996).
One determinate of goodwill is reputation, and it is valued, along with the other
goodwill contributors, as the present value of the expected future excess earnings
of the ﬁrm. Yet, an unidentiﬁable, intangible asset is generally not recognized in
accounting records unless it has been paid for in an arm’s length transaction.
Contrary to claims by skeptics, the value of trust, or its “worthwhileness,” can
be measured in business transactions. Dasgupta (1988) uses simple game models
to illustrate this economic value. He argued that trustworthiness is similar to other
assets, such as knowledge and information. However, economists have invested
so little time in measuring and understanding trust that this asset remains on the
periphery of mainstream economics.
TRUSTWORTHINESS AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The culture of a ﬁrm is largely determined by the values and beliefs of its past and
present owners and employees, particularly its board of directors and manage-
ment. The importance of trust relationships will vary within and across ﬁrms
because of this historical human diversity. In fact, a competitive advantage
associated with trust can only be sustained when the reputation of the ﬁrm is not
easily reproduced by other ﬁrms, that is, it is not easily imitable (Barney, 1986).
The inability to imitate corporate cultures produces, in part, the heterogeneity in
organizational structure and performance and the opportunity for a trust-based
competitive advantage.
Recognizing that some form of trust exists in all economic transactions, Barney
and Hansen (1994) attempted to categorize three trust relationships that are
observable in business transactions. They argued that weak-form trust is evident
in exchanges with limited opportunity for the exchange partners to take advantage
of one another. Price discovery is nearly costless; quality can be easily evaluated;
little time must be spent in the transaction; and “customer satisfaction is
guaranteed.” Most day-to-day market exchanges fall into this category. Challenges
associated with opportunism, holdups, moral hazard, and adverse selection are minor.
Semistrong-form trust, according to Barney and Hansen (1994), is evident
when a formal or informal governance mechanism exists to facilitate exchanges
when the potential for opportunism is present. Formal forms of governance, such
as contingent claims contracts, sequential contracting, and various forms of
alliances, discourage opportunism. Informal forms of governance would include
a market for reputations and social networks that create incentives for compliance
over time.
Strong-form trust exists between two parties when they know that opportunistic
behavior would violate a commonly shared standard of behavior. In this case the
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reduce uncertainty in the exchange. Exchange partners are trustworthy because of
who they are and the business values they share. Parties to a transaction look after
the best interests of each other.
Barney and Hansen (1994) speculated that strong-form trust may be rare in the
economy and, therefore, represents a source of strategic advantage for businesses
successful in locating other strong-form trust partners:
While the number of strong form trustworthy exchange partners in a particular segment
of the economy is ultimately an empirical question, it seems like a reasonable guess
that strong form trustworthiness in at least some segments of the economy is probably
rare, and thus (assuming exchanges with other strong form trustworthy exchange
partners are developed) at least a source of temporary competitive advantage for strong
form trustworthy individuals and ﬁrms. p. 186)
Other authors have not chosen to “guess” about the empirical importance of
trust relationships in business. Ottati (1994) found that trustworthiness was an
important part of personal capital in industrial districts where trust substituted for
ﬁnancial collateral in loan applications. Burchell and Wilkinson, (1997) quanti-
tatively and qualitatively evaluated the role of trust in 60 ﬁrms in Britain,
Germany, and Italy. They found evidence to support Arrow’s (1974) claim that
trust is an important social lubricant across businesses in these three countries. We
now explore the empirical reality behind Barney and Hansen’s (1994) “reasonable
guess.”
RESEARCH DESIGN:AM ULTIPLE CASE EXPERIMENT
As agricultural businesses consolidate and industrialize, case study research
becomes an increasingly useful tool for exploring the “black box” of organiza-
tional structure and managerial decision making within the ﬁrm (Sterns et al.,
1998). Analysis of human interaction where and when identity matters is
facilitated by the case study method.
Yin (1994) noted that case studies are analogous to experiments in the physical
sciences. Experiments are helpful in testing existing theory and developing new
theory. Case studies, according to Yin (1994), are not capable of producing
generalizable results to populations of business ﬁrms. Rather, case studies
improve our understanding of theory. In this experimental vein, we proceed to test
Barney and Hansen’s (1994) conceptual model of trust relationships in business.
We selected six relatively small agribusiness ﬁrms in Pima and Pinal Counties
in southern Arizona as experiments. The ﬁrst ﬁrm is a retail supplier of high
quality plant material to homeowners and apartment residents in urban Tucson.
The second ﬁrm, a wholesale plant nursery, grows and distributes plant material
to retail nurseries and landscape contractors throughout Pima County. The third
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Phoenix metropolitan area. A 2,000-acre cotton farm was the fourth business
selected. Fertilizer, insecticide, and herbicide are the principle products sold to
local farmers by the ﬁfth ﬁrm, a chemical supply business. Finally, our sixth ﬁrm,
a beef cattle feedlot, purchases dairy calves and raises them to be sold as
replacement heifers or veal calves. The feedlot averages 1,800 animals in
inventory during the year.
The research design focused on the one-way trust relationship between the
owner/operator of the business and the ﬁrm’s employees, customers, and
suppliers.
Interviews were scheduled, and Table 1 was mailed to the owner/operator 1
week in advance of the interview. The owner/operator of each business was
interviewed for a minimum of 1 hr, with some interviews running over 2 hr. We
Table 1. Trust Categories for the Agribusiness Firm (Adapted from
Barney and Hansen, 1994)
Trust The conﬁdence that any vulnerabilities you might have in a market exchange
will not be exploited by the other party. The certainty that you will not be
taken advantage of by the other business or individual.
Weak trust Exchanges where there is limited opportunity for one party to exploit the other.
Neither party is vulnerable; the quality of the goods and services can be
evaluated at low cost, and no money or time needs to be invested in
contracts. For example, highly competitive product markets will be a form of
weak trust where both parties win in an exchange. Examples would be buying
gasoline for your car; buying ofﬁce supplies; and hiring minimum-wage,
temporary workers.
Semistrong trust Exchanges where vulnerabilities exist but you are protected by a formal or
informal contract, by your power to leverage the other party’s reputation if he
or she fails to comply, or by membership in a governing organization that will
enforce compliance. For example, you may sign a contract or verbalize a
contract to deliver a certain amount of product to a customer or accept
delivery of a product from a supplier. Or your dominant economic position in
the industry may be a threat to a supplier or buyer if they fail to comply with
an agreement—you could destroy their reputation in the industry. Or an
organization guarantees compliance with agreements by alerting members to
businesses in default or arrears, and in some cases, ﬁning these ‘‘cheater’’
ﬁrms.
Strong trust Exchanges where vulnerabilities exist but you are protected by a set of values,
principles, and standards of the other party that have been internalized by that
individual or ﬁrm. Any exploitation of your vulnerabilities would be against
the values, principles, and standards of behavior of the other party. Although
there is opportunity for cheating, business is conducted irrespective of the
existence or nonexistence of any contract, enforcement mechanism, or
policing organization. For example, loyal employees in responsible
management positions look after the best economic interests of the business
even when there may be some personal incentive to behave otherwise. Or a
supplier tells you about price discounts even if it may not be in his best
economic interests to do so. Or a buyer helps you by taking excess inventory
off your hands.
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operations and the deﬁnitions in Table 1, the owner/operators were asked to select
the type of trust that characterized their economic relationship with employees,
customers, and suppliers. Trust was distributed over a ﬁve-point scale, with
weak-form trust 5 1 and strong-form trust 5 5. A trust level was selected for the
seven most important employees, customers, and suppliers. Importance was
deﬁned as the economic revenue or cost associated with that individual or ﬁrm.
After the ranking exercise, the owner/operators discussed the reasons for their
rankings.
With this experimental design we performed a preliminary empirical test of
Barney and Hansen’s (1994) three forms of trust. Are these forms of trust
understood by business executives? Do they have meaning in their day-to-day
operations? Do all three forms exist simultaneously? If so, what is the distribution
or mapping of trust across business relationships? And ﬁnally, do these maps vary
by business, and if so, how do they vary and why?
RESULTS:T HE NATURE AND INCIDENCE OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
Owner/operators experienced little difﬁculty understanding the types of trust
outlined in Table 1 and during the interviews quickly applied them to their
business operations. These small business executives spoke freely, and in some
cases passionately, about the role of trustworthiness in their business relation-
ships. Trustworthiness is a business asset, according to these executives, provid-
ing competitive advantages to the ﬁrm. Fig. 1 captures the nature of these
advantages with respect to their source and process characteristics as described by
these managers.
Employees, customers, and suppliers approach a transaction with a basic set of
beliefs and values associated with how they do business. These behavioral
fundamentals produce observable characteristics in the trading parties handling of
the transaction. Repeated observations of these characteristics create a trustworthy
reputation for the other party. Trustworthiness increases business ﬂexibility,
reduces risk, saves managerial time, and reduces monitoring costs. All six
managers indicated that semistrong- and strong-form trust relationships create
competitive value for their ﬁrms.
According to these owner/operators, trustworthiness takes time and money to
develop and to maintain as a productive asset. However, unlike depreciable assets,
trust appreciates in value through experience. Strong-form trust, and even forms
of semistrong trust, substitute for investments in other formal governance
activities (e.g., monitoring mechanisms) and reduce the probability of noncom-
pliance.
The owner/operators noted that price and quantity were critical considerations
in all business relationships because of their direct impact on proﬁtability. Yet
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necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for business success. Identity signals embed-
ded in economic exchanges were critical too. The “who” of trading relationships
is not dominated by the “how much.” Both economic signals are vital.
Table 2 summarizes the rankings across the three types of business relation-
ships. For both suppliers and customers, weak trust associated with identity-less
markets represented 18–34% of these relationships. The majority of these
exchanges contained some degree of economically relevant identity through
formal or informal contracts and/or high levels of assurance that all parties’
interests will be protected. In the case of employer-employee relationships, strong
trust (a ranking of 5) dominated the other two forms. Important labor inputs in
these ﬁrms represent much more than a commodity where price and quality are
easily discovered in a nonopportunistic market.
These executives use three forms of governance in their business transactions:
the market, contracts, and social capital or strong-form trust. This empirical result
supports Lewicki and Bunker’s (1996) claim that ﬁrms maintain a portfolio of
governance mechanisms in their business transactions in their efforts to minimize
transaction costs that are subject to the operational needs and constraints of the
business. We found all three governance forms in all ﬁrms. Informal and formal
contracts (semistrong) and social capital (strong form) were more prevalent than
markets (weak form) in the portfolio for the most important transactions.
The multiple-case design also produced support for Lewicki and Bunker’s
(1996) hypothesis that some trust relationships evolve over time. Weak trust
relationships can evolve into semistrong- or strong-form trust transactions as the
number of transactions increases and the trading parties become more acquainted.
For example, all six owner/operators indicated that most employees are hired
either “as commodities” or “under contract,” but a selected few become
strong-form trust employees in the ﬁrm. Some suppliers and customers also
followed this evolutionary pattern toward a noncalculative relationship.
Trustworthiness mappings (Fig. 2) for the six ﬁrms provide a graphical account
of the three fundamental empirical relationships associated with trust summarized
in Table 2. Noteworthy is the moderately positive correlation between economic
importance and the form of trust for ﬁve of the six ﬁrms. The more economically
Table 2. Level of Trust for Three Business Relationships (Number and










Suppliers 9 (24) 9 (24) 10 (26) 4 (10) 6 (16)
Employees 7 (18) 0 2 (5) 9 (23) 21 (54)
Customers 14 (44) 2 (6) 10 (31) 2 (6) 4 (13)
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customer, the more likely the relationship is characterized by semistrong or strong
trust. Secondly, the variability in trustworthiness internal and external to the ﬁrm
is revealed. Varying degrees of strong trust dominate the internal employer-
employee relationship, whereas exchanges with suppliers and customers can
range widely depending on the identity of the party. Finally, Fig. 2 reveals the
variance or diversity in trustworthiness in business relationships across these six
small agribusiness ﬁrms.
Retail Nursery (Thirty-ﬁve Employees)
Ofﬁce and management employees received strong-form trust rankings by this
owner/operator. But the potential for opportunistic behavior by sales clerks and
laborers is limited, so their transactions were ranked as weak-form trust. This
retail executive found no source of vulnerability with either his customers or his
suppliers. Customers numbered in the thousands and purchased relatively small
quantities of plant material and supplies throughout the year. All parties in the
transaction easily evaluated price and quality information. Similarly, the major
suppliers of plant material operated in a highly competitive commodity market
where the success of proﬁtable opportunistic behavior was limited.
Wholesale Plant Nursery (Twenty-eight Employees)
The employees in this family-operated business shared similar business values
and goals with the owner-operator. Most of these workers were cross-trained to
work the sales counter, water plants, load trucks, make deliveries, or work in the
greenhouses. Vulnerability to opportunistic behavior was possible in the mind of
the executive, but strong employer-employee relationships reduced the probability
of occurrence. Customer trust rankings varied from strong-form for the most
important customer, a landscape contractor, to weak-form and semistrong-form
for retail nurseries and other landscapers. The opportunism of suppliers was
managed through informal and formal contracts where the interaction between
buyer and supplier was on a weekly basis with well established ex post facto
means for resolving conﬂict.
Dairy Farm (Seventeen Employees)
Again, important management employees, such as the dairy foreman, calf barn
attendants, and milking parlor shift supervisors, shared high levels of social
capital with the owner/operator to counteract opportunistic temptations. Other
employees, such as milkers, cow pushers, and feed truck drivers, were governed
by the market where expectations on both sides were understood and failure to
comply terminates the employment relationship. The dairy’s three customers, one
for milk and two for calves, ranged from contractual for ﬂuid milk, strong-form
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Strong-form trust characterized the two most important feed suppliers. The
operator commented that a high level of assurance that quality feed would be
delivered in a timely manner created economic advantage to his ﬁrm in the form
of lower cost per hundredweight of milk produced.
Cotton Farm (Eight Employees)
The governance mechanism of choice for employees, customers, and suppliers
was contractual in nature for this cotton farmer. Vulnerability was managed
through formal and informal agreements that spelled out expectations and
conditions associated with a transaction. Not a single business relationship was
ranked as strong-form trust. Only one employee relationship exhibited weak trust
where the owner/operator was not exposed to opportunism. Opportunism,
according to this cotton farmer, was present to some degree in all his transactions,
and he used agreements between the transacting parties to manage his risk.
Chemical Supply (Thirteen Employees)
The owner/operator emphasized that he could not operate his business
successfully without strong-form trust with all his employees. Potential oppor-
tunism by salesmen, yard staff, and delivery people created high levels of
vulnerability for the ﬁrm. The executive noted that he only retained honest, “low
maintenance” employees he could trust with money, chemicals, and customers.
Likewise, this chemical supply ﬁrm had semistrong- to strong-form trust
relationships with its major customers. Opportunism was managed through
handshakes and verbal agreements. Relatively less important suppliers were
ranked in the direction of weaker-trust relationships.
Beef Cattle Feedlot (Four Employees)
This family-operated feedlot raised replacement heifers and veal calves.
According to the owner/operator, strong-form trust employees were critical for his
business. He noted that his employees started out in semistrong-trust relationships
but evolved into “high quality” employees he could trust while he was away on
business trips. The top two customers or buyers were ranked in the strong
category. The manager attributed the diversity of ranking for to the working
relationship the owner/operator had developed with the individual salesperson,
with feed grain, veterinarian services, and hay receiving higher trust rankings than
suppliers of equipment, power, and fuel.
Four central tendencies that can serve as testable hypotheses in further research
efforts emerged from these results. First, it appears that weak trust or commodity-
like exchanges do not dominate the most important economic transactions in these
ﬁrms. Owner/operators interact with employees, suppliers, and customers based,
190 International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Vol. 2/No. 2/1999in part, on their identity. Formal and informal contracts are agreed on; business
values and beliefs are shared and understood.
Second, the predominant business relationships have a degree of semistrong
trust as their central feature. Contrary to the standard production theory of the
ﬁrm, the agribusiness world is characterized by exchanges where vulnerabilities
exist, and the executive is protected via formal or informal contracts, reputation,
or by a third party enforcing compliance. This ﬁnding challenges the widely
taught view of the ﬁrm as primarily a technological relationship (i.e., production
function) stripped of all human identity. Interaction with input suppliers and
customers is the major activity of the business ﬁrm, according to these six
owner/operators.
In response to Barney and Hansen’s (1994) “guess” about strong trust, we
found that strong trust is found in the three types of business relationships to
varying degrees. A set of shared values, principles, and standards do not protect
the executive in all, or even most, exchanges, but the existence of internalized
trustworthiness exists and is not “rare.” As previously noted, strong trust is most
evident with economically important employees who share responsibility for
managing the ﬁrm.
Of the six businesses, only the retail nursery was directly interacting with the
consumer of the ﬁnal product in the agribusiness distribution chain. We hypoth-
esize that the closer the business is to large numbers of the ﬁnal consumers, the
more prevalent weak trust will become in these business relationships. The
owner/operator of the retail nursery in this study viewed all his customer
relationships as commodity-like where there is limited support for opportunism.
Price dominates all sales in this ﬁrm.
SELECTED IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRIBUSINESS MANAGERS AND
RESEARCHERS
These six business experiments revealed that
• Investments in trust-based relationships can produce competitive advantages
based on noncalculative behavior.
• Strong-form trust relationships with employees, although not always possible or
appropriate, are a legitimate means for achieving superior economic perfor-
mance.
• The portfolio of governance mechanisms ranging from the market to strong-form
trust should be evaluated continuously in an effort to reduce transaction costs.
• Ex ante and ex post facto contracting talents serve the agribusiness executive
well because most key business transactions are characterized by some degree of
semistrong-form trust.
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(Mitntzberg, 1971; Kotter, 1999), indicated they devoted a majority of their
business day to working with people, primarily on logistical issues. These
owner/operators invested signiﬁcant time “designing and maintaining” the inter-
nal and external economic relationships of their businesses. Trustworthiness in
these relationships creates operational efﬁciency beneﬁts by freeing up valuable
managerial time resources that can be reallocated to economically productive
activities.
Likewise, these experiments revealed that agribusiness managers operate under
extreme time pressures, and economic decisions are made within this binding
temporal constraint. Bounded rationality accurately characterizes their day-to-day
decision making. Marginal decisions on the allocation of physical assets appear to
be made quickly and accurately given the time available for the decision.
Finally, these empirical results lend support to the claim that identity-relevant
economics should occupy a greater amount of space in agribusiness journals and
discussion time in classrooms. Institutional design, contracts, agency, interaction
costs, collective action, social capital, and game theory capture a greater part of
the intellectual core for understanding many important economic transactions.
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